Segundo-Ortin, Miguel and Calvo, Paco (2023) Plant sentience? Between romanticism and denial: Science. Animal Sentience 33(1)
ABSTRACT:
A growing number of non-human animal species are being seriously considered as candidates for sentience, but plants are either forgotten or explicitly excluded from these debates. In our view, this is based on the belief that plant behavior is hardwired and inflexible and on an underestimation of the role of plant electrophysiology. We weigh such assumptions against the evidence to suggest that it is time to take seriously the hypothesis that plants, too, might be sentient. We hope this target article will serve as an invitation to investigate sentience in plants with the same rigor as in non-human animals.
Harnad, Stevan (2023) Insentient “cognition”?. Animal Sentience 33(2)
Struik, Paul C (2023) Plants detect and adapt, but do not feel. Animal Sentience 33(3)
Gutfreund, Yoram (2023) Questions about sentience are not scientific but cultural. Animal Sentience 33(4)
Milburn, Josh (2023) Plant sentience and the case for ethical veganism. Animal Sentience 33(5)
Pessoa, Luiz (2023) What can plant science learn from animal nervous systems?. Animal Sentience 33(6)
Robinson, David G; Blatt, Michael R; Draguhn, Andreas; Taiz, Lincoln; and Mallatt, Jon (2023) Plants lack the functional neurotransmitters and signaling pathways required for sentience in animals. Animal Sentience 33(7)
Yilmaz, Özlem (2023) Stress: An adaptive problem common to plant and animal science. Animal Sentience 33(8)
Booth, David A (2023) Sentience: back to the science from the words. Animal Sentience 33(9)
Dung, Leonard (2023) From animal to plant sentience: Is there credible evidence?. Animal Sentience 33(10)
Brooks Pribac, Teya (2023) Language matters. Animal Sentience 33(11)
Carls-Diamante, Sidney (2023) Plant sentience: Bias and promise. Animal Sentience33(12)
ten Cate, Carel (2023) Plant sentience: A hypothesis based on shaky premises. Animal Sentience 33(13)
Mastinu, Andrea (2023) Plant sentience: "feeling" or biological automatism?. Animal Sentience 33(14)
Mallatt, Jon; Robinson, David G; Blatt, Michael R; Draguhn, Andreas; and Taiz, Lincoln (2023) Plant sentience: The burden of proof. Animal Sentience 33(15)
Damasio, Antonio and Damasio, Hanna (2023) Sensing is a far cry from sentience. Animal Sentience 33(16)
Vallverdú, Jordi (2023) What if plants compute?. Animal Sentience 33(17)
Solé, Ricard V. (2023) Do plants have the cognitive complexity for sentience?. Animal Sentience 33(18)
Bennett, Tom (2023) Cognition is not evidence of sentience. Animal Sentience 33(19)
Birch, Jonathan (2023) Disentangling sentience from developmental plasticity. Animal Sentience 33(20)
Henning, Tilo and Mittelbach, Moritz (2023) Complex floral behavior of an angiosperm family. Animal Sentience 33(21)
Plebe, Alessio (2023) Plant sentience: Time scale matters. Animal Sentience 33(22)
Baciadonna, Luigi; Macri, Catherine; and Giurfa, Martin (2023) Associative learning: Unmet criterion for plant sentience. Animal Sentience 33(23)
Dolega, Krzysztof; Siekierski, Savannah; and Cleeremans, Axel (2023) Plant sentience: Getting to the roots of the problem. Animal Sentience 33(24)
Ivanchei, Ivan; Coucke, Nicolas; and Cleeremans, Axel (2023) Dissociation between conscious and unconscious processes as a criterion for sentience. Animal Sentience33(25)
Broom, Donald M (2023) Limits to sentience. Animal Sentience 33(26)
Correia-Caeiro, Catia and Liebal, Katja (2023) Animal communication and sentience. Animal Sentience 33(27)
Burgos, José E and Castañeda, Giselle M. (2023) Crazier hypotheses: Panpsychism. Animal Sentience 33(28)
Tiffin, Helen (2023) Plant sentience: Not now, maybe later?. Animal Sentience 33(29)
Rouleau, Nicolas and Levin, Michael (2023) Multiple ways to implement and infer sentience. Animal Sentience 33(30)
Harnad illuminates the implications of the other-minds problem both for the human species and other species. He argues that as humans, and particularly thanks to Descartes’ Cogito (“I think therefore I am”), we have learned to accept that other humans have the capacity of feeling like we do, even if we can never be certain of it. Although Descartes thought that due to a lack of pineal gland, all other species were mindless robots, we have learned to accept that other species can feel, especially mammals as they are most similar to us. However, when it comes to certain species (reptilians, amphibians…), Harnad demonstrates that we are less inclined to give the “benefit of the doubt” that they also do experience feelings. We instead more easily dismiss our great mind-reading abilities as “anthropomorphic illusions”, as their careless and free exploitation is seen as “profitable”.
ReplyDeletePS: This is especially the case for fish — Brian’s paper argues that giving fish the “benefit of the doubt” and accepting fish pain at face value could have financial and personal consequences, such as for native subsistence fishing.
Anaïs, good that you added that second thought about fish. The real uncertainty is not there, but much lower, with the simplest invertebrates, plants and fungi. Whereas most specialists disagree with Key's conclusion that fish cannot feel, they also disagree with Segundo-Ortin and Calvo's conclusion that plant's can. What is the difference between the evidence in the two cases?
DeleteI think the reason is that it is unreliable if we infer the sentience capacity of plant from their observable behaviors - having the same appearance does not entails that they have the same function. Research on fish behavior and physiology has provided substantial evidence suggesting that they are capable of perceiving and responding to their environments. This includes studies on their ability to sense pain, display avoidance behaviors, and show signs of stress or distress when exposed to harmful stimuli. For this reason, the specialists disagree with Key's statement, due to fishes' complex nervous system.
DeleteIn contrast, plants have the very different biology compared to animals. They lack a nervous system and a centralized brain-like structure, which are typically associated with consciousness and sentience in animals. Roughly, we could suspect that their outset to have this thesis is flimsy somehow.
Evelyn, valid points.
DeleteHi Anaïs, I had the same exact thought to tie this reading back to Key’s article.
DeleteI agree that the passage that you mention very well demonstrates the weighing of consequences that Prof Harnad emphasizes when deciding to give the “benefit of the doubt” of whether animals feel or not, and wanted to elaborate on this point!
We can consider the two options: to either give fish the benefit of the doubt and believe that they feel (option A) or to not (option B.)
As you mentioned, Key cites one consequence associated with option A as the possibility that this might affect human nutrition and food supply as well as the economy. (As I wrote in my 11a commentary, I can’t say that I agree with this: most of us conclude that mammals feel, but the meat industry is doing just fine.) Key also notes that a stance such as option A would “quickly lead to unsupported anthropomorphic conclusions, such as believing fish either feel happy being in company of other fish, or they feel disappointed when they fail to capture prey." (Which I don’t really see the issue with.)
The consequences for option B are that fish are subjected to pain, fear, loneliness… but that we’re unaware of this fact, because we’ve assumed that fish don’t feel at all.
The consequences for option A clearly pale in comparison to those associated with option B, which is what the Animal Sentience article points out.
I wanted to add onto the ethical dilemma in deciding whether to attribute feelings to animals. You pointed out that the meat industry is doing very well, regardless of the fact that we all know that mammals can feel. And I do agree but I also think there is a question of "closing our eyes" and people do not want to actually admit it to themselves. Because there is a difference between receiving cooked meat directly in your plate and actually watching a video of animals getting murdered. I think if a lot of people would watch it, people would be more and more disgusted
DeleteSo I do think it is a question of people wanting to ignore as much as possible that animals have feelings at the end of the day.
I completely agree with Struick. I think the argument for plant sentience is wrong. Calvo's main arguments are showing what these plants can do : detect, adapt and signal. But none of that means that they feel. Now, how exactly does that differ from animals? From everything I've read, I would say the distinction is that animals behave, and their behaviour can be attributed to sentience. Plant "actions" cannot. I also believe the type of tissue is important : a nervous system. But, I am not sure how to justify that without being circular.
ReplyDeleteEmma, it's not circular: like behavioral evidence, neural evidence is correlational -- but that's just what it is with humans too, because of the OMP.
DeleteI really liked Luis Pessoa's read. He emphasizes that the study of animal nervous systems can provide insights into the possibility of cognition and sentience in plants. Specifically, he notes that very different functional and anatomical structures lead to cognition and sentience in different species, and that researchers should not assume that a centralized brain is necessary for these constructs to exist. For example, mammals have a highly centralized brain, while birds have a more distributed brain structure that allows for similar cognitive abilities. Thus, if we study more about animal's nervous systems, we can uncover more information about plant sentience.
ReplyDeleteMarie-Elise, first, bird nervous systems are not much more "distributed" than mammalian and reptilian ones. It's cephalopod brains that are more distributed, but with them, as with birds and reptiles, the behavioral evidence of cognition and sentience is already enough to surmount the OMP. It's with the Cnidarians>/a>that OMP uncertainty begins to appear, but with fungi, plants and microbes, which have no nervous systems at all, that the uncertainty really flips in favor of the zombie null hypothesis, even before you get to crystals, cannons and canyons...
DeleteYes, I would like to add that the distinction between the evidence for fish and plants lies in the observable behaviors and biology of the two groups. Fish, with their complex nervous systems and behaviors indicative of pain perception, have substantial evidence supporting their capacity to feel. In contrast, plants lack a nervous system and centralized brain-like structures associated with consciousness in animals. In this sense, for me it is normal that some would disagree that plants could feel.
Delete
ReplyDeleteThis reading helped me see the relevant implications of the OMP. From previous discussions we’ve had surrounding OMP, I saw it as more of a theoretical/philosophical point that we’ll never really know if the person next to us is actually feeling, or whether our hypothetical T3 robot will be able to feel. But as this reading points out, “members of our own species are not at risk from our scepticism [of whether another being feels]”, but rather, other species are at risk. Particularly, the false assumption that many non-human animals don't feel the same level of pain/distress that we do causes many humans to treat them in incredibly unethical ways. Thus, getting the OMP wrong has dire consequences in everyday life. I'm not sure if this was immediately obvious to others from past weeks, but it was really emphasized for me in this week's readings.
Jessica, it's always the OMP, even in Israel and Gaza. We ignore the message from our mirror-neurons because my self-interest trumps the heterophenomenology of your pain (for me), and vice versa...
DeleteHi Jessica,
DeleteI agree with you that this reading has helped enlighten a lot what the OMP is, and how it takes part in our species in comparison to other species.
When I was reading, I could not stop thinking about how the OMP seems to me as a form of anthropocentrism in itself. Because trying to understand animals through the lens of what we think is a mind/perceiving/feeling is wrong. Some species might work completely differently from us, might not need language in the use of words to describe their feelings, might use hormones or electrical signals to communicate, might not need to feel to have proper minds, etc. And we can't even grasp the sense of their minds/cognition since it is not even conceivable in our conceptions. This might be too simplistic or too fatalist, but I think the OMP, the Easy Problem, the Hard Problem, and philosophy in general really are anthropocentrism problems and ways to analyze the sense of life through humans' lenses. And therefore, because limited by our own minds and conceptions, I doubt we will ever be able to grasp entirely how other species' minds work.
Jueliette, we don't need to grasp exactly what other animals are feeling; only that they are feeling -- and that where there is feeling, there can be hurt (the Precautionary Principle). Our main evidence comes from our anthropomorphism (mirror neurons), and its main opposition comes from our anthropocentrism (cognitive dissconance).
DeleteIn this reading, Harnad starts by describing the OMP, which revolves around how we can only feel our own feelings, and that of others must either be inferred through their behaviour, or directly told. When it comes to the explanation of how and why organisms have minds, the latter remains unsolvable, this being the hard problem. Thanks to language and our mind-reading abilities, the OMP is minor within our own species. However, in the case of other species that lack the ability to speak, this problem becomes more salient, especially when behaviour is minimal or absent. From my understanding, the question is not whether animals feel, as any organism with internal or mental states also has felt states, and thus sentience. Therefore, the question becomes "what are they thinking and feeling?". Indeed, The OMP is not our problem, but rather the problem of other species, if we assume that they do not feel when in reality they do feel, their feelings can be hurt, ultimately leading to suffering, thus having severe consequences on their wellbeing. To me, this reading highlights how as humans, we tend to neglect other species due to their perceived differences, exploiting them, denying their fundamental rights, and attempting to reduce our guilt by attempting to convince ourselves that they do not feel the pain we impose on them.
ReplyDeleteMelika, good points, but if you de-weasel it (even the words of the OMP: what does that become, once de-weaseled?) -- you will notice a few more things (including that this is not about the HP). Why do babies not need to be able to talk for parents to be able to sense their pain?
DeleteBabies don’t need to be able to talk for parents to be able to sense their pain because the OMP only gets difficult as the behaviour and ecology of the species is increasingly different from ours. Even though babies cannot tell us how they feel, parents infer from their nonverbal behaviour that they do. As a social species, we have also especially attuned our mind-reading powers to be especially strong for our young.
DeleteJocelyn, but see the replies about neonatal anesthesia.
DeleteI really enjoyed this reading’s expansion of the Other Minds Problem. The OMP has come up in some of my other classes this semester and I had previously only ever considered it in the context of other (human) minds. While reading, I was interested in Professor Harnad’s assertion that humans are better mind-readers because of our language abilities. This made sense to me based on our discussions of language in class, as well as the intuitive idea that if someone tells you “I’m in pain” it feels like they must be in pain. I found a reply to Professor Harnad’s paper by Marthe Kiley-Worthington, who challenged this idea. Kiley-Worthington argues that other animals have “context-dependent nonverbal skills” that may indicate they are better mind-readers than us. These skills include things like signaling levels of excitement, like when a dog wags its tail, with the source of the excitement coming from contextual clues. Kiley-Worthington suggests that because these animals lack the ability to verbally refer to out of context events, they require even better mind-reading abilities and awareness of others than our own to understand each other. While she raised many interesting points, I tend to agree with Professor Harnad’s argument that our language abilities that enable us to have these discussions in the first place indicate our greater mind-reading abilities. Overall I thought this reading by Professor Harnad was a very interesting evolution of the Other Minds Problem.
ReplyDeleteLillian, good reflections. I defer to Marthe Kiley-Worthington who is one of the world's great horse- (and elephant-) whisperers and therapists.
DeleteI enjoyed Kiley-Worthington's paper as well, she makes a relevant point that we tend to make an us-them distinction between humans and animals, assuming animals function like less intelligent, non speaking humans, though this is far from the truth. A behaviour I associate with animals having feelings is their tendency towards social activities like play that seem to have no other purpose than the feeling of fun. This behaviour indicates a mind-reading capacity to tell apart play fighting from real aggression. That being said, Prof. Harnad's reply rings true, that our capacity for context-independent language extends our ability to mind-read so that we can understand the hurt of others in more detail than other species can.
DeleteAdrienne, good points. But mind-reading is a mirror-capacity shared with nonhuman animals, including empathy and intention- and emotion-perception, not just language-mirroring. Language in this case is more like "mind-writing" than "mind-reading", whether it's used to tell others the distinguishing features of edible mushrooms or to tell others that you have a toothache.
DeleteI found Kiley-Worthington's response paper both revealing and thought-provoking. While it’s true that the scope of context-independent language allows for mind-reading of a much wider kind than the mind-reading available to nonhuman animals, it’s equally true, and only now is beginning to be understood, that some of our close relatives in the mammal family not only feel, but are aware of and can read the feelings of others (including other species, like us humans — and in some cases they do it better than us!). Elephants in particular are a tragic case of human failure to listen to our mirror neurons, as our hunting of these great creatures for their ivory has led to drastic population declines which become more alarming by the decade. When considering the similarities between human and elephant displays of feeling, such as our similar patterns in mourning our dead, one wonders what justification we can present.
DeleteAdam, you are right -- and Kiley-Worthington is an elephant- and horse-whisperer.
DeleteOne part of this reading that I really liked, and which I thought about when reading the last paper, is related back to mirror neurons and empathy. We believe other people have minds because when we are using our mind-reading powers we mirror feelings, and this makes us feel what we believe the other person is feeling. This relates back to mirror neurons which are active when one organism observes another organism doing things that the other organism can as well. When mirroring something (which we can call empathizing), if that being makes us feel we are likely to attribute that being with sentience. We however have to choose to empathize and use our mind-reading capacities. Like Harnad said in response to Jessica, when our self-interests are stronger, such that we no longer wish to empathize, it is easier to do what we want to those that we deem as feelings less, less like ourselves. What else makes us turn off this natural inclination to empathize? I can think of many but I would be interested in what others can think of.
ReplyDeleteFiona, good insights. Now de-weasel even the OMP itself: It will save words.
DeleteFor the disastrous effects of turning off one's own mirror-neurons, one need only consider (both sides) of the Israel-Gaza horrors.
Sometimes conflicts of self-interest, as between obligate carnivores and their prey, are dictated by the basic necessities of survival. For that we can blame only the lazy and morally Blind Watchmaker (evolution). But when it comes to the exercise of Baldwinian skills in the Anthropocene (human-dominated) Era, our interests are not just the necessities of survival, but untrammelled cupidity. And the biggest losers are all other species.
De-weasel the OMP itself. How do we know if another being (human, animal, plant) feels something being alive? We can’t know for certain but assuming that anything doesn’t because they are different from us is cruel and horrifying. Empathizing seems like a mirror-function but sympathizing should not be limited to our in-group (whether its culturally, economically, animal species, or otherwise).
DeleteKristi, good points. The "Other Minds Problem" certainly contains a weasel-word. It should really be the OFP ("Others' Feelings Problem")...
DeleteThis text by professor Harnad allowed me to better understand the other minds Problem (OMP) and how it is related to sentience, particularly animal sentience. Indeed, as he mentions in the text, we don’t have a problem feeling our own feelings or inferring what other humans are feeling because we have the capacity to produce language, and for the cases in which it is not possible for a person to express how they are feeling through language, we can always infer their feelings based on their behavior. However, unlike humans, animals can't use language to convey their feelings. Professor Harnad points out that for us, the OMP becomes particularly challenging for animals like reptiles, fish, or amphibians. Indeed, to us, their behavior might seem robotic, making it hard for us to see them as having feelings. Moreover, I believe that there is a key issue that we are sort of leaving aside when we try to decide whether an animal is capable of feeling. Different species evolved in different environments and under different circumstances, which possibly led to the development of feelings that we cannot “mind read” in other species (because they are not present in our species) leading us to the faulty conclusion that they must not feel.
ReplyDeleteValentina, before we blame our brutality on the fact that nonhuman animals cannot speak, let's remember that human slaves could, and so could indigenous people, and so could women, and that was not enough to stop us, at least not until brutality and domination had prevailed for a long, long time (which for many continues today).
DeleteThat said, there is no question but that humankind's greatest crime has not been against humankind but against nonhumankind. And it's not even considered crime, as under our laws, nonhumans do not yet have rights or interests. They may as well be mute zombies. Only their "owners" may have (property) interests in them.
I too, think that this text pinned down the OMP for me, making me understand it better. Now my questions are, how is not understanding other species evolutionary ? In fact, why should we be able to understand each other - through language for example - in a clear way? We do have some insights and ideas about how an animal might be feeling, but we can never really know truly, especially as it cannot be conveyed by language - the clearest confirmation. Now if we assume that it just makes sense evolutionarily - which it should as species have survived until now. Then, is it to make us insensible, would not being able to understand an animal's feelings be better for us. If yes, is it because of alimentation or competition? If we could all understand each other's feelings maybe we would not be able to eat each other or compete against each other? Is brutality engrained in us to survive?
DeleteGarance, evolution is lazy (and apathetic). Genes certainly make carnivores aggressive toward their prey (when they are hungry) and their competition (when resources are scarce). But it's not so much that evolution has selected against more accurate mind-reading of other species (except our predators -- and, if carnivores, our prey), but rather it has not made our mind-reading more accurate than it needs to be.
Delete
DeleteIt was an interesting point that humans do not evolutionarily have more mind reading abilities than we need, as this relates to how mothers had an innate ability to sense the distress of their infant that non mothers or non family members did not have. It is for the same reason that we are able to have more empathy for people when undergoing perspective taking (such as “imagine that it was your child..”) when we are able to relate that person's experience to our own or those we closely care about. This seems to all connect the mind reading abilities we have with humans to the very evolutionary survival of one’s genetic line (with an innate ability to sense when those closest to you are, especially children and immediate family members, are in distress. However since we also have some extent of mind reading abilities with animals, I am curious then how this relates to our own survival. Could it be related to the way humans have often relied on animals in history, where to a certain extent the animals' well being was related to the humans' well being (such as horses for example as transport)? Is there a way to utilize this to increase some form of perspective taking with animals to improve the way we treat them?
Rebecah, I think the answer is the same for our own children, others' children, and other mammals: the tell-tale signs are the same, and our mirror-neurons detect them.
DeleteProfessor Harnad’s explanation and discussion of the OMP emphasises the central importance of this problem and its consequences. Similar to previous skywriters, this reading caused me to readjust my perspective on the OMP and its implications. What I found most interesting is the point that we tend to attribute feeling/sentience to those that resemble us in some way (whether this a resemblance in appearance or behaviour), and that we are less likely to make these same attributions if we have a motive to do so (as Harnad notes these motives can be financial, personal, or scientific). Further, I think that by presenting the consequences of an error of the OMP (where we falsely conclude that an animal cannot feel/is not sentient, when they actually are) speaks strongly to Key’s paper “Why fish do not feel pain.” In Key’s paper he argues that fish do not feel pain, and it is harmful to do so because of the consequences of claiming that fish feel pain on the fishing industry or on research efforts. This is in contrast to the consequences of claiming fish do not feel pain (when they do), which, as opposed to financial harm, is actual felt suffering.
ReplyDeleteShona, I think I am hearing your mirror-neurons. (Do you still hear them when you come to the table?)
DeleteThis reading dives into the other-minds problem, which refers to the challenge of understanding and inferring the thoughts and feelings of entities. Harnard explores whether this problem is unique to studying organisms with minds or if it extends to other unobservable phenomena. In this reading especially, I feel like the hard problem contrasts with the easy problem in a very distinct manner; how and why organisms minds work, beyond the observable behavior in contrast to explaining observable behavior without considering feelings/thoughts, basically without considering our minds. Harnard also delves into the human ability to mind-read within our own species, emphasizing that humans are adept at inferring the thoughts and feelings of others through speech, behavior, and even brain activity (if we know how to interpret it). It is then acknowledged that mind-reading within our species is relatively straightforward due to shared language and behavioral cues. The discussion extends to mind-reading in other species, highlighting that while it's easier with mammals and birds (because they and their young resembles us), it becomes challenging with species whose behavior and ecology differ significantly. Harnard towards the end emphasizes the importance of acknowledging the sentience of other species and discusses the potential consequences of error in assuming they lack feelings, which I wholeheartedly agree with, since animals have been treated based on the assumption that they are “feelingless machines” which has raised ethical concerns.
ReplyDeleteFor the link just below it should be The infancy of infant pain research: the experimental origins of infant pain denial. The Journal of Pain, 14(4), 338-350.
DeleteSelin, did you know that it used to be believed that human babies, before they can talk, don't feel -- and that they used to be operated on without anesthesia? Rodkey, E. N., & Riddell, R. P. (2013). The infancy of infant pain research: the experimental origins of infant pain denial. The Journal of Pain, 14(4), 338-350.
ReplyDeleteIt's truly mind-blowing to consider that anesthesia wasn't officially recognized for infants until 1987. The story of Jeffrey Lawson is heartbreaking; he was a premature baby who underwent open-heart surgery in 1985. Jeffrey was fully awake during the surgery, without any anesthesia or pain analgesic, and sadly passed away five weeks later. Mothers were advocating for their infants to be acknowledged as feeling pain, highlighting the crucial importance of the innate mind-reading abilities that mothers possess, although the recognition of newborns feeling pain shouldn't hinge on whether one is a mother or not. It should go without saying, just as one’s race should not be considered when assessing pain sensitivity. This is in contrast to the misguided beliefs of the 20th century, as mentioned in the article, which erroneously considered some races as "less sensitive" to pain, receiving fewer analgesics.
DeleteNatasha, spot-on. There is so much to be learned from this human-infant/nonhuman-animal comparison -- about both the OMP and ethics.
DeleteI did not know that and this has truly shocked me. What shocked me more is that anesthesia wasn't recognized for infants until 1987?! That means that until a very recent time, we thought babies didn't feel until they talked? Now that we have a complete opposite view on this, I am very curious as to what they said to support their claim that human babies didn't feel pain.
DeleteI tried to read the article but the page gave me an error :/
Selin, this should work: https://www.jpain.org/article/S1526-5900(13)00025-4/fulltext
DeleteThis is truly something that I had never considered would have been the case when it comes to our past beliefs about the capacity to feel. Although pointed out in the paper, the question of precisely what is being felt in other species is debated, it is hard to believe that there was a time (not that long ago) that we were not using anesthetics for infants.
DeleteIn the supplementary work that was provided above, it states that during experiments done to determine whether infants did in fact feel pain, clear responses were often discounted as reflexes. While I understand that it is easy to look back on this and see the glaring errors, it seems clear that in a situation where they were unsure whether infants experienced pain it would always be better to operate under the assumption that they do. This would prevent numerous negative effects that subsequently occurred from our lack of caution in this area.
In this week’s text, Harnad discusses the OMP. He explains that the OMP in the context of the human species is not a huge problem because we can communicate feelings through language and infer them through behaviour, but it becomes more problematic when discussing non-human species. However, the fact that babies weren’t given anesthesia until 1987 because it was believed that they could not feel pain is ridiculous. As Natasha mentioned, there were experiments done to test whether or not they could feel pain and the consensus was that the reactions were simply reflexes. This seems remarkably similar to the arguments that Key mentioned in his text, where he explained that although fish attempt to escape from noxious stimuli, they do not feel pain. It has been proven with babies that this assumption is not only illogical but could be very dangerous as well.
DeleteJenny, rationalizing to resolve cognitive dissonance by changing assumptions to support our preferred conclusion can take many forms. It was easier, faster and cheaper for surgeons not to take the complicated precautions for general anesthesia in neonates, so they just immobilize them. (It’s still done in docking industrial piglets’ tails and castrating the male piglets, as well as de-beaking baby chicks and grinding or boiling male chicks live in egg “farms” [why?]. It’s especially easy to discount others’ pain, since you do not feel it yourself.
DeleteMegan, the assumption is dangerous in both cases: to the babies in one and to the fish in the other,
In his article, Harnad redefines the scope of the OMP. It has been defined as the problem by which we cannot infer that other people are sentience as we can only be certain that we feel. But in the human species that problem is minor as we have rather reliable ways to infer other people’s felt state: language, inference from non-verbal behavior, and mindreading. It is mindreading that is argued to be misleading or just wrong in inferring felt states of other species: the OMP is a problem of other species. One point that was interesting to read was how we know animals are sentient, but still for other reasons (financial, personal, or for research purposes) deliberately ignored that fact. It goes to show a hierarchy of values and interests in the human’s head, which demonstrate a hierarchy in values of species, putting humans at the top.
ReplyDeleteI also find it striking how, even within the human species, certain individuals can effectively switch off their mirror capacity — whether by ignoring, acknowledging without empathy, or lacking such capacity altogether — towards specific members of their own kind. This ability, fueled by an insatiable hunger for money and power, creates divisions within the human population, generating a hierarchy not only in the valuation of different species but also within the human community.
DeleteMitia & Natasha, in a conflict between vital (survival, life-or-death) interests, every individual has the right to put its own survival interest first, whether the conflict of vital interests is between obligate-carnivores and their prey, or self-defence in mortal combat. It is the pursuit of non-vital interests (money, power) that produces the most harm and hurt. (See the research on cognitive dissonance.)
DeleteMany people do not neglect the fact that animals do have feelings, but choose to ignore them to reap the benefits of using them for our own purposes. Hanard says that our ability to mind-read our own species is due to our access to other people's thoughts through language--whether it be speech or gesture. We can also infer feelings by observing the behaviors of a baby who cannot speak. Our mind-reading abilities also extend to other species, but we better empathize with those that more closely reassemble us. This reminded me of some conversations I had with friends about our feelings towards family pets. My friend has developed a deep emotional connection with her cat after spending 17 years with her. She says that she knows her cat loves her because she will meow and come cuddle her when she enters a room or hears her voice, and act distressed when she's not there. I feel the same way with my dog. My other friend has never grown up with a pet and doesn't understand how someone can develop a deep connection with an animal. I think this also has to do with how much we are exposed to other animals--repeated activation of mirror neurons while observing their behavior over time allows for the development of empathy. Our morality is not struck as hard when we are not the ones working in slaughterhouses even if we still eat meat because we are physically removed from the act of killing (we do not observe and therefore empathy is reduced).
ReplyDeleteElizabeth, all valid observations. We imprint on our family animals as we imprint on our offspring (whether consanguine or adoptive) and family. And it's all mediated by our Darwinian mirror-neurons.
DeleteThis week discusses the OMP within and across species. I’m wondering how this would apply to humans that don’t experience empathy (e.g., antisocial personality disorder). Although we can never know with absolute certainty (because we will never be the person who does not feel empathy), does it still feel like something to feel nothing in response to cruelty/injustice? We could hypothesize that cognitively (in terms of thinking), these people might be able to think and rationalize about another person’s negative experiences but they do not experience mirror-neuron empathy. Humans without empathy are still grounded in sensorimotor experience. So, even if they cannot categorize through direct felt experience (in the case of emotions), they have language and can learn based on the description of other grounded categories. So they could learn to sympathize?
ReplyDeleteKristi, sympathy can be learned, just as psychopathy can be. Lazy evolution even leaves that to Baldwin. Mirror-capacities probably have a learned component too.
DeleteLet's just hope it's not the psychopaths that get to govern us...
According to the OMP, 'we will never know' whether and what other living organisms feel. Therefore, Gutfreund (in his answer to Segundo-Ortin & Calvo) claims that sentience is only a matter of cultural belief that can’t be investigated scientifically. But, as Professor Harnad said, science is not about certainty but about the most probable theory. So, what are the available options to investigate sentience in other species? To my understanding, the only way is to find behavioral and neuronal correlates of feelings in humans and then look for similar behavioral and neuronal activity in other living organisms (this is what Key did). Therefore, that process is necessarily limited and anthropocentric since we are the only species in which we can correlate feelings (verbally reported) with behaviors and neural activity. In animals with totally different nervous systems and behaviors, how can we investigate feelings since they may be of a completely different kind?
ReplyDeleteOn the other hand, the argument of the benefit of the doubt (like Pascal’s wager) in favor of animal sentience is only a pragmatic consideration but not a scientific argument in favor of animal sentience: there are more ethical consequences in wrongly believing that animals are non-sentient than assuming they are.
Joann, Please read the published commentaries of the 50+ specialist's on Brian Key's target article. Most are more versed in comparative behavioral neurobiology than Key.
DeleteKey considered both the behavioral and the neural evidence. But he (1) profoundly misunderstood the neural evidence in an arbitrarily anthropocentric interpretation, ignoring the vast evidence that exists on parallel and convergent evolution ("multiple realizability"), and on that basis he (2) rejected the prima-facie behavioral evidence of pain.
"Benefit of the doubt (like Pascal’s wager) in favor of animal sentience is only a pragmatic consideration"
Only?
See Animal sentience and the precautionary principle, which has since changed British Law on cephalopods, which are considerably further from human nociceptive behavior and neurology than fish...
In "Animal Sentience and the Precautionary Principle," Johnathan Birch formulated a precautionary principle applied to animal sentience. The precautionary principle is a pragmatic consideration to prevent the uncertainty of science from paralyzing political action in the case of potential seriously bad outcomes, such as climate change. In this scenario, a lower level of scientific proof is required for political action (but it's not about lowering scientific standards). In the case of animal sentience, the suffering of millions of animals is clearly a serious issue that requires the precautionary principle to be applied. Birch decomposed that principle into two concrete rules:
Delete- the epistemic rule: in the presence of at least one credible indicator of sentience in one species of the order, then all animals of the order should be treated as sentient.
- the decision rule: the scope of animal protection legislation should include all animals for which the evidence for sentience is sufficient according to the epistemic rule.
In the case of cephalopods, he argued that a credible indicator of sentience has already been found, so these animals should be protected by animal legislation.
I think it is possible that our mirror neuron system is somewhat of a “false guide” in telling us whether organisms besides ourselves are sentient. As Harnad notes in the paper, our mirror neuron system is activated when observing other mammals and their young, due to their resemblance with our own. Because of this, we feel a sense of empathy towards them, and conclude that they don’t just behave, they also actually feel. However, Harnad also notes how fish do not trigger our mirror neuron system as acutely, because (by no fault of their own obviously) they lack eyelids. Since our subjective feeling that other animals are sentient is tied to how much they (by chance!) trigger our mirror neuron system, perhaps it is not a reliable marker of sentience in other organisms. Furthermore, as was pointed out in the skywritings, we can turn off (or rather choose to ignore) our mirror neuron system, which is adaptive because it allows a starving bear to maul a deer without being held back by pangs of empathy. I think it's also possible that our mirror neuron system might overextend to trees in some instances, which clearly lack sentience. Therefore, when looking for sentience in other organisms, we should not be too reliant on the highly subjective and fallible signals of our mirror neuron systems. Instead, I think comparative neuroanatomy (like what we explored in the previous paper) might be a more reliable avenue for exploring sentience in other organisms.
ReplyDeleteYes but I think mirror neurons and might provide more insight into the HP than does comparative neuroanatomy or neuroscience in general, which is still difficult for me to believe (feel).
DeleteDani, you wrote: "I think it is possible that our mirror neuron system is somewhat of a “false guide” in telling us whether organisms besides ourselves are sentient... I think comparative neuroanatomy (like what we explored in the previous [Brian Key] paper) might be a more reliable avenue for exploring sentience in other organisms."
DeleteDid you read what most of the comparative neuroanatomists who commented on Key's paper think about the reliability of Key's conclusions?
Mirror neurons are fallible guides (as are our intellects) but I think you're overstating this when you say they are "false." We outgrow our juvenile, anthropomorphism about trees.
But when it comes to OMP, be careful not to tumble into a scientistic mind-blindness (if not a downright phobia about anthropomorphizing) that afflicts many researchers on "consciousness"...
Csenge does not seem to have caught the bug.
I did read the responses of other neuroanatomists, but I think the problem is not that comparative neuroanatomy is a bad line of inquiry, I simply think Key's application of it was too simplistic. I think comparing the functional organization of brain networks between species would be a more effective approach than comparing cytoarchitecture. This would allow us to find similarities between brains regardless of whether they're organized with nuclei or laminar cortices, allowing us to come to more nuanced conclusions about whether fish can feel pain...
DeleteDani, but I think the behavioral and ethogical evidence is already there, loud and clear. No need to hurt them more to prove that it hurts.
DeleteHarnad redefines the Other Minds Problem (OMP), traditionally understood as the difficulty in inferring sentience in others since we can only directly experience our own feelings. He argues that this problem is minor in humans due to reliable indicators like language, non-verbal behavior, and mindreading abilities. However, the real challenge of OMP lies in understanding other species, where mindreading is often misleading or incorrect. Harnad points out that although we recognize animal sentience, human actions often disregard this knowledge due to financial, personal, or research interests, reflecting a value hierarchy with humans at the top. For humans, understanding others' feelings is easier through language and non-verbal cues, but this becomes difficult in infancy, aphasia, sleep, anesthesia, and coma. The article questions the evolutionary reason and adaptive value of having a mind, defining having a mind as having the capacity to feel or sentience. The challenge of OMP increases with the behavioral and ecological differences of other species from humans. There's a higher risk in assuming other species do not feel when they do, as it can lead to harm, emphasizing the importance of doing the right thing ethically.
ReplyDeleteAimée, good summary. Now what do you think?
DeleteUnder the section of “sentience”, Harnad addresses the problem of what one can feel, think, and do in the context of humans:” I know at first hand, in Descartes’s way, what I am feeling or thinking. Other humans can tell me in words what they are feeling or thinking, so I need not rely on reading their minds. And they can show me what they can do by doing it, and I can observe that.” One of my biggest takeaways from this course is in acknowledging the limitations of this, particularly in the example of recalling the name of my third grade teacher. What people say is not enough in that they themselves don’t even know what underlies their own homunculus.
ReplyDeleteJocelyn, you are mixing up some EP and HP questions here: can you untangle them for HP? (Read the other comments and replies.
DeleteOne of the most interesting points I found in this reading is the connection between the OMP and ethics, namely how it's the problem of other species as they suffer as a result of our inconsideration for their feelings. From there, I found the Yilmaz paper on plants experiencing stress to be fascinating, as the connection between stress as a physiological response and the bad feelings of stress seems obvious for us as humans, and at first glance, it could seem analogous for plants. From here, I understood the main difference between plants and animals that makes it that plant sentience is more contentious is their absence of a nervous system, which I find connects to the HP as we would have to know, causally, what about our nervous system makes us feel.
ReplyDeleteOmar, a solution to the HP might have helped, but the question of plant sentience is still just an OMP matter. Compare (carefully) the peer consensus on Key's negative conclusion about fish sentience with the peer consensus on Segundo-Ortin & Calvo's positive conclusion on plant sentience.
DeleteIt seems clear to me. In the 'Insentient "Cognition"?' article, Harnad wrote: "In the case of animal sentience, the question is: which behaviors, and which capacities (whether behavioral or physiological), of which animals, are credible and reliable correlates and predictors, hence evidence, of feeling." But this is hard and technically impossible to solve with certainty because we don't know how or whether an animal feels, because of the OMP. But we can certainly infer, and we should give the benefit of the doubt for ethical reason. (Global health, climate and economy would also benefit from worldwide veganism, in the ways shown in the Covid article!)
ReplyDeleteCsenge, and let's forget about certainty, outside the 2 Descartes domains (which, and why?).
DeleteThis reading touches on the other-minds problem. It reminds me of another paper where it mentions that understanding what it’s like to be an animal is the equivalent of an alien questioning what it is like to be human. We might not know what it’s like to be a bat, but we still know for sure that it’s *like* something, and we are not in the position to assume that they are incapable of having rich experiences. They quote Thomas Nagel’s view that we should not disregard their experiences just because we cannot explain it, because that would be the crudest form of cognitive dissonance. It also mentions how humans like to live in a little bubble. It is not hard to find out the unpleasant truths of where our food comes from or what other humans do to animals, but ignorance is so much easier than acknowledging it. If someone doesn’t want to know something, then they are not going to know it.
ReplyDeleteAndrae: "know for sure"? see reply to Csenge above!
Delete(BTW, the title of Nagel's famous paper is needlessly weaselly: it's not about "what it is like" but about "what it feels like" to be a bat. (Nagel assumes, almost certainly correctly, that bats do feel.)
My mistake. We wouldn’t know for sure because it is impossible to be 100% certain about if and how animals or even other humans feel, this is the other mind's problem. We are only certain about our own feelings (I think, therefore I am). We can’t be sure if others feel, but at the same time, we also cannot be sure that they don’t feel, so the best we can do is opt for what’s more likely to be.
DeleteA thing I find fascinating is our need as a human species to want to stick to the status quo; we have always considered other species as less than, and sadly, the majority is finding it difficult to change this way of thinking. For example, we saw the profound positive impact that the absence of our usual activities have on our planet during the pandemic, but we went right back to "the usual" afterwards. We don't seem to want to change unless it would benefit us. I think this way of behaving and thinking (i.e., dare I say, selfish behaviour) is one of the main reasons why most scientists refuse to even entertain the fact that other species are sentient and feel just as we do (albeit in a way that we cannot/may never quite comprehend due to the OMP).
ReplyDeleteHi Aashiha
DeleteI think the point you raise is extremely important and relates to the reading in 11a. A lot of us fall into the is-ought fallacy where we make claims about what things ought to be based solely on statements about what is. We truly believe that things ought to be the way they are because they currently are that way and that makes it just. I think that is why Descartes had no problems, and even attempted to biologically explain why animals couldn’t feel (as noted in this week’s article). We consume and use animals freely for our own survival and science and because it’s what we’ve always done then it’s just and what we ought to keep doing. It is easier for us to justify why the things we do are just rather than make holistic societal changes, which is why I believe articles like Brian Key’s from 11a will continue to justify why animals can't feel just like Descartes initially did.
Aashiha and Ethan, yes, habit, especially self-interested habit, is one of the reasons we keep doing -- and justify doing -- wrong: Slavery was wrong, the subjugation of women was wrong, colonial conquest was wrong. And they're still wrong, and still being done, but less. And many, perhaps most people, now support outlawing them.
DeleteBut I don't think habit itself is the only reason, or even the main reason, those habits are so tenacious. There are widespread habits that can change quickly. Since Covid, many, perhaps most people really don't want to work away from home any more. Yes, self-interest played a big role in that change, but it was quick, despite long habit.
A big difference in the case of our enslavement of animals -- yes, that's what it is, all of it -- is that they are defenceless against us. We don't accord them rights because we don't have to, and we can continue to breed, exploit and kill them.
So animals need advocates -- humans who make animals' interests their own. To awaken our mirror-neurons is to sensitize us to their plight. Not all vegans are animal activists, but most are sensitized. And it's no coincidence that about 2/3 of vegans are female. (I leave it to you to try to explain why.)
About why most vegans tend to be female. I think this is an interesting observation, a little bit more now after having read the other skies and replies, and seeing the discussion around “awakening” mirror neurons and becoming sensitized versus choosing to ignore all the evidence at hand out of self interest. Could it be that females have a greater tendency to become vegan because they are able to infer sentience for their own children (possibly out of self-interest), who when infantile cannot advocate and express their feelings through language. Maybe because women become sensitized in this way toward infants, they are more easily able to do this when it comes to non-humans? Perhaps this is even a Baldwinian disposition.
DeleteIshan, yes, I think so too.
DeleteI found the characterization of the OMP as more of a concern for other species than for us really illuminating. From our human perspective, the question of whether other species feel is a scientific one, or maybe a moral one if the answer has implications for our treatment of these animals. But for the animals whose ability to feel is in question, the OMP is about their survival and potential suffering. I find that this way of thinking about it helps me remember the gravity of the issue. It might also help Key and others not get too carried away by behaviourist analyses and to consider the nonscientific dimensions of questions like whether or not fish feel pain.
ReplyDeleteThe "Whose other-minds problem?" section is also what I found the most insightful in this reading. We often look at moral questions as matter of the effect on 'our own souls' for lack of better terms rather than as a question about the actual effect our actions have on those around us. This problem is particularly salient in matters of animal welfare. It is all too easy to get caught up in how animal suffering makes us feel (or not) or in the intellectual exercise of finding evidence without considering the actual effects on those we act on. I agree that Key too suffers from this problem.
DeleteAya and Marie, human victims can plead their cause; they have voices. Animals have only their human advocates.
DeleteProfessor Harnad’s article on the Other-Minds problem and animal feeling is extremely insightful and I wanted to focus mostly on the sections “Benefit of the doubt” and “Consequence of error”. In the benefit of a doubt section, Harnad goes over that both the hypothesis that animals feel and don’t feel are equally probable due to the inherent nature of the other minds problem and the fact that we just can't be sure if animals (and humans for that fact) feel at all. Therefore, we opt for the more probable option, being that animals and other humans feel, something that is easier for us to do because of our “mind-reading” powers. The consequence of error section builds on this saying that its safer to assume animals feel as assuming they don’t feel and being wrong is much worse for their welfare than assuming they feel and being wrong. I want to touch on the idea that the reason that it on the individual level it seems we all mostly agree that animals feel, whereas on a societal level (although there are ethical standards in place) it seems we freely do as we please to animals is due to the degree of separation, we have from them. Our “mind-reading” powers seem to come from activation of mirror neurons as we actively observe other humans and animals. The issue is that many of us don’t actively observe animals and how they feel. Very few of us participate in animal research and very few people are actively slaughtering animals for our food supply, so when we buy a steak, we don’t have to kill the cow ourselves. This is why it’s easier for us with that degree of separation to continue and encourage our current practices on the societal level.
ReplyDeleteEthan, children can get used to slaughtering animals for themselves; but they resist unless you keep telling them they have to eat animals to survive and be healthy (and especially if you tell them that animals were created for that purpose).
DeleteHi professor, I completely understand the point you're trying to make, but wouldn't also be the case that those same children, if shown compassion to the same animals a couple of times (enough to get their mind reading abilities activated) would revert back to resisting this urge? Especially as they are so close to the problem? As someone so far removed from factory farming and other atrocities committed to animals, I feel like forcing me into a situation (now maybe not when I was a child) where I would need to kill the animals myself would force me into a situation where I can't ignore the violence and would fight back. I assume it would be the same for the kids, if given the time for their mirror neurons and mind reading abilities to kick in.
DeleteEthan, I think you're right.
DeleteI agree! Another thing mentioned in the Harnad article that might make it easier for us to believe that humans feel is that they also demonstrate behaviors that make us feel like they can read our minds.
ReplyDeleteI'm wondering if this is something that might explain why it is so easy to feel like animals such as dogs feel, too, because many of their behaviors make us feel like they can read our minds and emotions despite the fact that they're a different species...
Miriam, yet we manage not to eat our babies before they learn to talk...
ReplyDeleteOhrie, mirror-capacities are reciprocal.
We are facultative omnivores, not obligate carnivores, like the Felidae. So our young are shocked to learn where meat comes from and need a lot of persuasion. They especially resist eating their pet bunnies (or chickens). But most can eventually be trained out of it.
Harnad's perspective on the Other-Minds Problem in animals reflects on our human-centric view that often leads to underestimating animal sentience, particularly in species that don't resemble us–similar behavior or language. This tendency not only reflects a hierarchical view of life but also raises ethical concerns about our interactions with animals. As the challenge of OMP lies in understanding other species, recognizing this bias is important for the Hard Problem, as it influences how we interpret animal behavior and understand their mental states. It's a reminder to approach animal sentience with caution and respect. I like to bring up that, in the case when fishermen catch fish, they always deliver a quick death to the fish as they recognize a slow death is still painful (and makes the fish taste bad).
ReplyDeleteDaniel, what is the difference between the OMP and the HP?
Delete(It is said that beating dogs before you slaughter them makes them taste better.)
Paniz, children know that peaches and cherries (and eventually even trees) are zombies, but, it takes a lot of persuasion (and not a few lies) to get them to believe that with their pet bunnies and chickens it's "us vs. them".).
ReplyDeletePaniz, children know that peaches and cherries (and eventually even trees) are zombies, but, it takes a lot of persuasion (and not a few lies) to get them to believe that with their pet bunnies and chickens it's "us vs. them".)
ReplyDeleteDon't be hopeless: help them.
The insightful exploration of sentience emphasizes the inherent connection between having a mind and the capacity to feel. Descartes' perspective adds depth, positing that possessing a mind involves the ability to feel rather than just “doing” (behavioral as seen in T2 and T3 robots). The challenge arises in discerning the feelings of others, especially in the absence of language, compelling us to rely on behavioral cues for inference. Importantly, the ethical dimension surfaces, asserting that if there's a possibility of sentience in other beings, moral considerations must shape our treatment of them. This complexity underscores a historical trend where assumptions of human superiority have long dominated, perpetuating a hierarchy against non-human entities.
ReplyDeleteI think the point you are making is very interesting. I found Professor Harnad’s article to be very eye opening, especially the part where he says: "So it turns out that the other-minds problem is not our problem: It’s the problem of other species, if they do have minds — if they do indeed feel, yet have the misfortune that our species does not know they feel, or does not believe it.” Unfortunately, I do not think that the Other Mind Problem is the only problem here. I don’t necessarily think that people don’t "know" or dont believe that animals feel. I think many people do believe that animals (or most anyway) feel and they just don’t really care. Thus I agree with your idea of historical Human superiority. I believe that allowing ourselves to make animals suffer is a matter of superiority maybe more than a matter of not believing that they feel. Which is even worse.
DeleteRosalie & Lili: Yet the sense of superiority has been ovecome before (though not fully enough yet): with racism, slavery, the subjugation of women, and colonialism.
DeleteThis week’s reading focuses on the OMP and how it is even more complicated when we consider other species. I resonated with the idea that “pain” does not need to be the sensation we experience in injury or loss, it can be any negative experience. For example, Ozlem’s paper explains that plants feel stress. This leads to avoidance behaviour, the same as many animals exhibit in response to pain. This means plant stress has the same function as pain, and they are analogous. This implies that simply researching how humans experience pain and verifying if fish have the same system is not enough to prove whether fish feel pain (or pain-like feelings) or not.
ReplyDeleteNico, Hans Selye's notion of "stress" is a bit fuzzy, but I think it is physiological and homeostatic rather than psychological, though it can have psychological effects (or causes) too. I think it has come to mean too many things to apply to the question of whether plants feel.
DeleteHey Paniz,
ReplyDeleteI think that it does absolutely matter that researchers understand that animals can feel, and in responsible animal research (the vast majority of animal research today, due to the presence of ethics boards and standards) this is an understanding that remains at the forefront of scientists’ minds. As an animal researcher, I spend a great deal of my time thinking about the costs of my work, and whether it is justified. Care is essential, and the idea that it is an ‘us vs. them’ binary ignores much of the reasoning that makes animal research worth doing (and indeed necessary) in the first place. The fundamental commonalities between humans and other animals mean that we can develop a greater understanding of processes that underlie animal cognition by researching in animals.
In a class like this, we explore critical questions of the mind and the emergence of self-awareness, but if we are to believe that the mind and brain are at all linked, these questions are unanswerable unless we understand more mechanistically about the brain. To do so, we need neuroscientific research, and with the methods available now, research in humans is insufficient to develop this understanding.
Madeleine, some animal research is potentially life-saving, but a lot of it is not.
DeleteHarnad explores the historical perspectives of Descartes in his analysis of the other-minds dilemma, shedding light on the complexities involved in understanding consciousness outside of a framework that is human-centric. Harnad raises important questions surrounding the attribution of sentience to other species, underlining the potential repercussions of making assumptions about their capacity for experience. The ethical dimensions of these questions are emphasized in his paper, especially when it comes to the treatment of animals. It highlights how important it is to consider the welfare of other sentient creatures and calls for a greater understanding of the possible repercussions of doubting them. This article provokes greater contemplation on the consequences of our comprehension—or lack thereof—of other species' experiences. It advocates for a more sensitive and nuanced approach to the investigation and recognition of many types of consciousness, eventually promoting a higher sense of accountability to other sentient beings.
ReplyDeleteIn this paper, Professor Harnad refers to the other-mind problem and describes it as a way of inferring the other’s emotional states. But since our feelings are the only ones that we can be sure to experience, those inferences can only be formed through the observable behaviors of others. Professor Harnad also mentions the role that language plays in admitting that other humans are able to feel; since we can verbally communicate on our emotional states, we can directly give the listener the cues to infer correctly the emotions we are currently feeling, nd it includes non-verbal cues as well such as the facial expression or the voice prosody. However, this uncertainty about the other one’s feelings could explain part of the interpersonal gap, which is the discrepancy between one’s intentions and the effects on the listener, since all the cues on which we base our judgment can fool us into thinking the speaker is experiencing a certain emotion, when he really isn’t.
ReplyDeleteAdrien, yes, exactly what another person feels is uncertain, even if they tell us. But the uncertainty that people (including babies) feel (OMP) is negligibly small (except for philosophers writing learnèd papers about scepticism). The question to ask oneself is whether it's less small with cow or a pig or a chicken, or even a fish, where something more than a learnèd paper is at stake...
DeleteI'm absolutely with you, Paniz. Almost no one I've spoken to about eating meat will try to deny that animals feel. Usually they'll find a way to block it out in their head, or (worse), make some argument about the apathy of evolution and circle of life and the "way of the world". It's a frustrating and confusing dissonance, but I see it in myself, too. I've been vegetarian for four years for these exact ethical reasons, but in my own cognitive dissonance, I've failed to make the full jump to full vegan.
ReplyDeleteI agree, too, that the horrors of what we've done to non-human species outweighs what humans have done to humans, but I don't know that human suffering and animal suffering maps one-to-one. I am all for giving the benefit of the doubt--I deliver bugs back outside instead of squashing them, and usher flies out the window instead of swatting them. But I'm also not under the impression that feeling in a fly or feeling in a fish (probably two different things) is equivalent to feeling of a human being. I think there is a line somewhere, but without knowing where it is, I won't draw it in my day-to-day life.
Madeleine, I think there is a place for animal research in science, as Harnad notes, when it is vital. But I don't think it's at all true that the presence of "standards" and ethics boards means that the vast majority of animal research today is responsible. Arguing for better treatment of animals, I once had a professor say, "you can do anything you want to an octopus", and he's right. Check out this article published Sept, 2023 in NATURE about how research in the US with cephalopods *might* require approval by an ethics committee... that means that currently--it doesn't.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-02887-w
ReplyDeleteThe examination of the Other-Minds Problem brings to light a significant ethical question: how do we treat animals, considering we're not sure if they experience feelings like we do? This urges us to think beyond just human experiences, suggesting that animals might have their own kind of sentience. It isn't just about scientific curiosity but more so a matter of doing whats right for other living things. Even though I can't be certain about what animals feel, it's probably better to lean on the side of caution. In my opinion, it's better to treat animals with kindness and respect, just in case. This approach doesn't answer many questions, but it encourages and ensures a more compassionate and empathetic way of interacting with other living beings.
ReplyDeleteI love how this week's readings showed how cog sci sheds light on the compassion, respect and consideration we should have for non-humans. Although I don't think that you should just do (or not do) something simply because of its likelihood (often difficult or even impossible to assess). Cog sci is making us question our decisions rather than just blindly following societal norms. As students, we often question whether the material we are learning really matters, so it's nice to have this course connect to real and relevant topics that are really worth reflecting upon.
DeleteRight? I remember reading a poem called Mercy about a little spider. I'll add the link to my comment. I feel like bugs get the worst treatment because most people find the way they look unpleasant or their fast walk and tiny bodies scare them. They are probably just as scared. When I first read the poem I felt compassionate but it didn't really stop me from being scared of insects and trying to get rid of them before they touch me. After the reading however, because it is somewhat scientific I felt more convinced that they were scared of me too. The next time I see a spider, I won't panic and I'll take a paper and a cup and have some respect for that spider. Here is the poem by the way: https://www.awakin.org/v2/read/view.php?tid=2535
Deletein this article Harnad elucidates the Other Minds Problem which he has also summarized in many responses to skywritings in a simplified manner which I thought was easily digestible: When and what are other beings feeling? This differs from the Hard Problem of how and why they are feeling. In this article he demonstrates how the other minds problem is easily overcome between humans because language allows us to voice our feelings to others, others's behaviours allow us to infer the feelings, and because the potential cost of not considering other humans as feeling beings is immense. He argues that this acceptance of sentience should be (and often is) extended to animals as well yet we still seem perfectly happy to inflict suffering upon them. This is due to the fact that they lack the language to express their feelings, their behaviour is often very different from our own and thus harder to interpret and attribute feeling towards, and the cost of treating them as insentient is, most people (mistakenly) believe, negligible or even preferable to the alternative of granting animals the rights they deserve as sentient beings and having to find a new food source (and source of wealth for many).
ReplyDeleteHi Ohrie! Mind reading allows us to pretty confidently say that other species feel. Since we don't really know what they feel, perhaps we should assume they feel like we feel? Although that might not be the case due to the evolution of feelings in different species... You also mentioned why it's a lot easier to think dogs feel. What's interesting about dogs is they have similar facial expressions to humans. Their use of their eyes and eyebrows seem to especially express similar emotions!
ReplyDeleteProf Harnad, we manage not to eat our babies before they learn to talk because we know that they will grow up into beings that will eventually be able to express their emotions with language. They are future communicators and perhaps it's easier to have empathy for another member of the same species since we were all once babies. Knowing that speaking humans feel, we can assume that these pre-verbal infants will eventually be able to do the same.
ReplyDeleteMiriam, do you think we don't eat (or hurt) our babies only because we know they will eventually feel?
DeleteI really appreciate the very humanistic approach Harnad brings to the Other Minds Problem in this paper. I always just thought of the OMP as an empirical issue, a question to ponder. Do other species feel? If so, how? If not, why do we feel but they don’t (i.e., what adaptive benefit was there for us to feel, above and beyond the adaptive benefit for us to do, that wasn’t true for other species)? If they do feel, are their feelings analogous to ours in form, function, and feeling? However, after this article, I have begun to look at the OMP as more of a humanistic issue. We can’t ever be sure that other species feel anything at all, but to mistakenly take it as a fact that they don’t rather than a possibility is to give us permission to do all manners of things to them in the name that they don’t feel that would be abhorrent in the contrary. However, it is just as likely (actually probably more than likely) that they do feel, and so we need to be aware of that going forward. Prof. Harnad puts it best by saying that the OMP is actually a problem for other species, in the case that they do indeed feel in a world where we don’t know or believe it.
ReplyDeleteHi Stevan, your humanistic turn in thinking about the OMP is a compelling shift from an empirical to an ethical stance. You touched upon a profound realization; the OMP is not just about the factual existence of feelings in other specifics but rather also about the moral implications of our actions towards them under uncertainty. The article presented compels us to consider the ethical weight of our choice when the stakes are as high as potential suffering experienced by other beings. Your point on it being “just as likely (actually probably more than likely)” that other species do feel suggests that we as humans should err on the side of compassion. By highlighting the OMP as a humanistic issue, you focus on the fact that it is our responsibility as individuals to avoid the negative implications of anthropocentrism. If we cannot be sure whether other species feel, isn’t it an ethical imperative to assume they do? And if so, what does that mean for our societal practices that are inured to their suffering?
DeleteI find Tom Bennett's paper inspiring in relation to the topics of feeling and cognition. The paper raises questions about plant sentience and cognition, considering whether the behaviors and capacities observed in plants, like learning and response to anesthesia, are evidence of feeling or cognitive capacities. The distinction between vegetative and cognitive functions in plants is noted as fuzzy and potentially arbitrary. Meanwhile, the insights from Harnad's paper contribute to the discussion by emphasizing the distinctions between cognitive capacities and sentience, and the challenges in inferring sentience from observed behaviors, especially in the context of plants.
ReplyDeleteI was referring to Harnad's paper 'Insentient "cognition"?' in the comment above. The 'Animal Sentience OMP' reading in addition, made a point that while we can observe and measure behavior and its correlates, feelings themselves are not directly observable. This presents the OMP where inferring feelings in animals is crucial not only for scientific understanding but also for ethical considerations.
DeleteProf Harnad's paper clarified a few concerns I brought over from reading 11a regarding qualia and observation. I find it interesting that the other-minds problem is closely tied to sentience and vice versa. I saw a comment on this page which i lost where a peer said that this paper strays a bit away from an empirical approach to understand the OMP, and I completely agree. In fact, I think that's what made this reading so appealing to me, it allowed to me to explore the concept of cogito more humanistically. I think it makes sense that i can infer what someone feels because at one point I may have felt it, and when I ponder about this, it really helped explain why maybe we all hold on to certain values and beliefs so strongly even if they may be wrong in someone else's perspective. I never really thought that the OMP may be the reason I might disagree with someone about a political opinion, and they may disagree with me too; hypothetically they may infer that my position is irrational if they could not feel what I feel about the subject. I wonder why Brian Key did not explore the OMP in depth in his paper about fish not being able to feel pain, it feels like a clear explanation that the OMP is a much bigger problem when we apply it in the scope of cross-species relationshships.
ReplyDeleteThe excerpt of this article that engaged me the most is the one relating to the ethical consequences of error. The first thing it made me think of is Pascal's Wager. This latter argues it's rational to believe in God to avoid severe negative consequences if God does exist. Similarly, the article suggests that assuming animals do not feel pain, when they might, has far graver ethical implications than wrongly assuming they do feel pain ; it’s probabilistic. This aligns with Pascal's principle of minimizing potential harm in the face of uncertainty (I think it’s our best bet since we might never have strong information solving the OMP). I just saw that this pragmatic approach was briefly mentioned above so I took the time to go over Animal sentience and the precautionary principle and realized how insightful it would be for us to apply the ASPP principle and its implementations (BAR and ACT) to avoid harming the maximum amount of other sentient species possible - especially given the skepticism surrounding animal emotions. However, the challenge remains in making people more empathetic towards animal sentience and altering their consumption habits accordingly, despite a general acknowledgment of animals' capacity to feel. What’s the best way to go about this?
ReplyDeleteI think(ironically), that for a lot of people this does require them to think anthropomorphically, as we only really know how we feel, and we are humans. This article touched me, particularly when it mentioned infants who can't communicate and feelings of loneliness, which, is a feeling we most associate with our species and as a feeling cannot be directly observed. I think the highlight on the fact that there is no certainty when it comes to the OMP is also important to drill into our heads. This forces an ethical decision, rather than allowing us the ability to claim the problem does not exist. I also think more education surrounding animal behaviour and animal treatment in elementary school may also make people more empathetic.
DeleteMamoune, the Precautionary Principle (PP) is related to Pascal’s Wager (PW, but the PP is not Pascal’s. And the PW (but not the PP) is wrong.
DeletePascal’s Wager (PW) is that you are better off assuming that Hell really exists, and that are you better off living life according to the rules of religion whether or not it’s true, because burning forever in hell is worse than just living one somewhat rule-constrained life.
That reasoning is incorrect for a simple reason. Although certain supernatural beliefs prevailed in Europe in Pascal’s 17th century, there were also plenty of other supernatural beliefs elsewhere on the planet, then and now.
So the simple way to Trump (sic) Pascal’s Wager is to up the ante, by evoking or inventing a rival supernatural cult, with other rules and consequences, according to which your eternal agony in the afterlife, if you follow YOUR cult’s rules, rather than MY cult’s rules, will be far worse than just fire and brimstone…
The only thing PP and PW have in common is taking into account the size of the consequences of the truth or falsity of premises.
Supernatural premises are cheap, and just a matter of credulity: anyone can make them up.
But whether another organism feels is a matter of certainty, for that other entity, if it really does feel, and we treat it as if it were just a zombie, because we believe it does not feel.
Josie: nothing wrong with thinking anthropomorphically about other species, when the correlational evidence is there: if it looks and acts as if it were in pain when something is done to it that would make me look and act like that way, and would hurt. To instead ignore that would not be to be anthropomorphic, but anthropocentric (if not solipsistic.
Heeding the PP (and your mirror-neurons) under those conditions would be more like following the Golden Rule, but not for supernatural reasons…
Thank you for your reply Professor! I'm not sure I understand that part of your answer "whether another organism feels is a matter of certainty, for that other entity" though, what about the OMP? I thought that the "sentio ergo sentitur" only applied to us as individuals. Should we take the evidence indicating that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness as not underdetermined?
DeleteMamoune, I ca be certain that I feel, but I cannot be certain that you feel. But I can be certain that IF you feel, you too can be certain that you feel.
DeleteThe exact same is true of every other sentient creature.
Wow, well that was an emotional read. Harnad's "Animal Sentience: The Other Minds Problem" very clearly distinguishes between the OMP, EP and the HP, and then applies the OMP to species other than our own. I found this article to be truly poignant("for feelings, if they are being felt can be hurt"!) and it clearly highlights that the outright denial of the possibility of animal sentience is used for personal and monetary gain. Harnad is not denying the possibility that animals aren't sentient, and reminds us that in science, we can never be completely sure. I thought the implications of mirror neurons was interesting, because they are a "mind-reading tool" for us(we can never be sure, but they offer hints). With other species, of course we could never be sure of how they feel(the OMP), but I wonder if further research into their own mirror neurons(if they have them) would shed some light on how they "mind-read" others in their species.
ReplyDeleteJosie, mind-reading is based on correlations as well as mirror-neurons, even in our own verbal species (think about it). Our mirroring capacity is partly innate for our own species, partly learned, but always a matter of probability, not direct observation, which we only have for our own feelings (Descartes).
DeleteThis reading cleared up my understanding of the other mind’s problem. However, while reading I began to notice that the other mind’s problem and solipsism seem very similar. From my understanding, the OMP deals with the question of how one can know whether another organism feels or what it feels. Solipsism is the idea that one’s own mind is the only thing that they can know to exist, we cannot verify whether any other people’s minds exist. Is solipsism just an extreme version of OMP, changing the emphasis of the question to existence?
ReplyDeleteMaria, solipsism is about certainty; the OMP(and science) is a matter of probability.
DeleteHey Elliot,
ReplyDeleteThanks for your response, I was unaware of the protocols (and previous lack thereof) around cephalopods. I'm glad to see they are now protected under the same standards as vertebrates in the US. I think one of the reasons I find the argument for 'essential research' only a bit challenging is because we often have no idea what is essential, and what research is going to result in findings that could improve the wellbeing of humans, until it is done. If we are to only use animals in translational research, then basic research (that seeking to enhance our understanding of fundamental biological / cognitive / physiological processes) would stall, and translational would follow it soon after. I think that if we (the royal we) agree on the premise that we want to do what we can to decrease suffering of both humans and all other animals in the long run, then some degree of basic research (that which may seem inessential by itself) is necessary. And I think that the protections we have for animals used in this research can always be improved, but the need for continued improvement shouldn't discount the value of the protections already in place.
I see where you're coming from with your "essential research" challenge. Science does build on itself, and by being conservative in what research we define as "essential" it's possible that we will reduce the amount of findings that eventually might help us in the long run. But I am OK with losing out on that vague possibility if it means a certainty of reducing suffering now. I think in most cases of animal research though, it's intuitive whether or not something is essential--you know it when you see it, and we probably agree on those cases. As for agreeing on the wish to decrease human and non-human animal suffering in the long run, you are right. But when is the long run? 10 years? 100 years? Let's start decreasing suffering in the long run by decreasing it now.
ReplyDeleteFrom this reading, I have come to the conclusion that it is impossible to locate and fully understand a causal explanation for feeling. Harnad explains that this explanation must have to do with the feelings that we feel on a daily basis helping us at one point or another with survival as many of our other characteristics such as instincts do. This seems to fall short when we begin to dive into how the reasons for our capabilities in action have no explanation. Overall, these readings have also reminded me how much scientific and cognitive science questions, specifically in terms of ethics, normally come back to feelings and humanity. In experiments animals are often seen as below humans, and there’s often a hierarchy within the animals to dictate which one’s receive our compassion, such as dogs, and which ones do not, such as rats. There is a disregard for their ability to feel, as seen in the Key article. It helps to remind us how similar all organisms, human and non-human, are and the need for compassion and talking on behalf of those who do not have the capability to do so.
ReplyDeleteDelaney, our doing-capacities (EP) do have (or will have) explanations; it’s feeling (HP) that looks hard (perhaps impossible) to explain.
ReplyDeleteLiving with a recent first time mother and her young child, I can certainly see the extraordinary capacity of animals to mind read their young, she seems to understand her son's mental states to an extraordinary degree, she acts as a translator and has taught me how to understand the pre-verbal baby's intentional states. Although, I'm still going back and forth on mirror neurons and empathy, or even mindreading. While we are the champions of mindreading, as professor Harnad says, I wonder if we cannot elucidate mind reading through other species (that might not have mirror neurons), a waggle dance seems pretty mind-reading-y to me, and I'm unaware of bees possessing mirror neurons. Although professor Harnad has made his stance on the intentionality as "understanding an other as directed to an external object" quite clear, I cant shake the idea that it is essential for mindreading! especially in social species.
ReplyDeleteAnyhow, it was a great paper, I just can't shake intentionality
Johann, I don't understand what you mean by "shake intentionality."
DeleteMy assmuption is that addressing animal abuse effectively may require more than just the activation of mirror neurons; language could also play a crucial role in the solution. As previously noted, "Activating our mirror neurons sensitizes us to the suffering of animals." While we might not immediately resolve the problem of Other Minds Problem (OMP), individuals such as Dr. Harnad, who are deeply concerned and empathetic towards these issues, have the ability to communicate ideas powerfully through language. My argument is that although people may vary in their sensitivity to animal OMP, it is both possible and essential to address it head-on. As the empathy of certain individuals is sparked by their mirror neurons, they can be the pioneers to use persuasive and direct language that influence the wider population. Harnad and the journal of Animal Sentience has already activated mine mirror neuron through words somehow, despite I still cannot "read" "fish" 's mind.
ReplyDeleteHi Jianjun,
DeleteI’m with you on the fact that rational arguments (shared via language) may convince people that (most) animals are sentient (at a high level of certainty) and thus are suffering, and that intensive farming has other serious consequences on the environment. But I think that convincing people is usually not enough to make them change their habits. That is the classic rhetorical distinction between convincing (using arguments) and persuading (using emotions): only persuasion can really convert thoughts into action. I believe that becoming vegetarian or vegan often requires an additional emotional commitment that follows, for example, watching atrocious animal conditions on the internet or in real life. In that regard, language might do the first step towards convincing people, but mirror neurons still must turn it into action. That’s probably the situation I’m in now, truly convinced and facing cognitive dissonance until I can align my actions with my opinions. But the transition involved changing well-established habits and ways of thinking that will probably require me to call on my mirror neurons by visually confronting myself with the reality of animal suffering.
J & J, it's not just images that can activate mirror neurons. Grounded words can too.
DeleteIn Professor Harnad’s paper, he outlines an argument regarding animal sentience and the consequences of assuming that non-humans cannot feel. Human beings have both the capacity to communicate how we feel, as well as an uncanny ability to intuit one another’s feelings. As such, although we cannot know for sure what other human beings feel, we assume they do based on what we observe from them behaviourally and what they say. While the barrier to understanding what a non-human feels may be slightly more significant, Harnad asserts that we can no more know if a baby feels than if another mammal does. Furthermore, he claims that assuming non-human animals do not feel has far greater consequences because it allows us to inflict significant pain without any kind of remorse. While I agree with Professor Harnad’s claim that the consequences of assuming animals cannot feel are greater than assuming they can, I believe human beings unfortunately have a tendency to make decisions and assumptions based on what best serves them, especially in a capitalist system in which being ethical or thoughtful is often not beneficial revenue-wise. The animal product industry generates massive amounts of revenue, thus it is beneficial for both the producer and the consumer who likes the taste of steak to assume that pigs and cows have nearly no capacity to feel, and are dying a quick and painless death to end up on their plate. We can also see this approach when it comes to climate change, in which large companies continue to use non-sustainable materials which are cheaper and methods which are faster to produce their products, and consumers continue to buy from cheap and convenient, but environmentally disastrous brands, regardless of the long-term impacts to the planet.
ReplyDeleteBefore reading this article about the OMP I had never considered the idea that it truly is a problem for species other than our own. Previously, I thought of the OMP as only useful for something like comparing a T4 and T5. I also think that calling it what it actually is, the other feelings problem or OFP really solidifies its importance when considering the impact on other species. To me, considering if a T5 robot has a mind means much less than considering if an animal species has feelings. By not using the weasel-word of mind instead of feelings, it feels more intuitive to me that other species of course have feelings.
ReplyDeleteThe commentaries of the optional reading raise a good point about what to consider when questioning sentience. It is important to distinguish cognition vs sentience. Being able to prove whether they have cognitive capacities is not equivalent to proving that they are able to feel. Because at the end of the day, unlike behaviours, feelings remain observable and immeasurable. Moreover, the other mind's problem also applies to plants, we cannot be certain whether others, including plants, have the ability to feel.
ReplyDeleteNone of these other species can communicate verbally, which really underscores the challenge of inferring what they experience mentally or emotionally. The statement "where feelings are felt, they can also be hurt" concisely conveys that sentience implies the capacity for positive and negative subjective experiences. Pointing out the importance of scientific and ethical reasons is a compelling argument. We often see people trying to figure out a person's feelings in life. Feelings are relatively private to a person. It is difficult for humans to figure out, know, and understand other people's feelings. When we want to observe the feelings and pain of a non-human creature, this process can be without moral theory. For example, to determine whether a fish has feelings, we must experiment with him. Is this process fair to him? Although in the end, our result may reach the result we want to know, is this process fair? Scientifically, we want to understand these species; ethically, we don't want to cause suffering if feelings or pain can be felt.
ReplyDeleteSiyuan, yes, there is that contradiction: What do you think?
DeleteThis is an interesting subject because I don’t believe it would make a difference (the pessimist in me) even if science could absolutely with 100% certainty prove that all animals, even the more robotic ones, are sentient. Obviously because of the OMP, we can’t but I think that is beside the point. Even if we could, species prioritize themselves and would choose to ignore the animal sentience and consume/use animals regardless. We care about animals until we’re tired and hungry, then choose to not care until we’ve satisfied our own needs first.
ReplyDeleteI think the action of blissfully ignoring animal sentience for our own use will only become a thing of the past when the pleasures of new technological innovation (plant-based proteins, faux leathers, etc..) outweigh the icky feeling that we ignore when we use animals (cognitive dissonance). I guess I am kind of an optimist because I believe humans (and we already see this work in action) want to be able to make the right choice and treat all sentient species equally.
Kaitlin, yes, we can afford to be patient till the icky feeling becomes obsolete because we can design and 3-D print any taste and texture we want. But can they afford to wait?
DeleteAn interesting thing is that, people tend to emphasise with animals they deem as “cuter” and have closer relationships with humans. Many people are more willing to agree that fish have no feelings but are less inclined to agree that their pet mammals have no feelings. I wonder if this is based on evolution, or mirror neurons? Evolution as humans and other mammals branch off in the evolutionary tree together, whereas fish and other animal groups remain distant. Mirror neurons function as being with pets for too long, humans are actually projecting their own feelings onto their companions, thus holding the idea that cats and dogs are more likely to have feelings.
ReplyDeleteHi Tina, I think this is a great point, we have to realize that when we have more compassion for "cuter" animals than others these considerations are completely arbitrary in relation to judging whether or not they feel pain. I'm thinking back to class when we talked about how humans have a remarkable capacity to "mind-read" others, humans or otherwise, and I think that we need to believe our gut feeling that an animal is hurting when we mind-read it to be without imposing this other criteria of whether it is cute to us or not.
DeleteCuteness is probably a mammal-infant universal; it is to a mammal mother what sugar was to a Pleistocene infant. Baby birds manage to tap into that same mammalian universal: it is part of fishes' tragedy that they don't.
DeleteThe other-minds problem is that we cannot confirm what is going on in the minds of others through observation, other than through interpreting their behavior. Between humans, we can bridge the gap through language by telling other people what we are thinking or feeling. Even then, we don’t really know what they are experiencing, just what they have told us. With animals, we do not have that benefit. This also relates to the hard problem in that if we reverse-engineered consciousness, how would we know that the other person is a thinking and feeling person? Personally, I do not really think it is a question of whether or not other species feel, but I suppose in terms of microorganisms and such there is a point where some organisms would not have the necessary structures to do so (like a nervous system). Fish, chickens, etc. should not be up for debate and the only reason they are is to try and justify their behavior.
ReplyDeleteKaitlin, I couldn't quite follow you. We don't just have language for OMP: we also have our mirror capacities (and reasoning). But I agree that the uncertainty with chickens and fish (and most invertebrates) is almost as low as with mammals and our own species. It's only with fungi, plants and microbes that it becomes more than a philosopher's abstraction or a side-effect of cognitive dissonance from what we are doing to them.
DeleteP.S. I think you are mixing up the HP and the OMP.
DeleteDescartes' Cogito, a foundational concept for certainty, held considerable influence, emphasizing subjective experience over external truths. Philosophy plays an important role in science, especially in this course; when we talk about feelings and thinking, I realize how incredible the integration of different elements is. The distinction between acknowledging personal feelings and attributing universal truth to all feelings is important. In subsequent epistemological inquiries, Descartes's formulation paved the way for exploring the boundaries between inner awareness and external knowledge. His nuanced interpretation acknowledges the lasting impact on philosophical thought while recognizing the outdated scientific hypotheses of Descartes' time.
ReplyDeleteProfessor Harnad shows how the OMP is especially relevant and critical for other species, in which humans constantly impose pain and suffering to animals since animal sentience (feeling) is not convincing enough for most people. This is largely due to the lack of linguistic ability of animals that would allow them to verbally convey what they feel. Since as humans, we have developed language, we can easily infer and feel pretty convinced that other people feel, since they can actively tell us what or how are they feeling. However, with animals, this is not the case and thus the OMP becomes especially relevant for animal species. Yet, nonverbal behavior is pretty effective in conveying felt states as well, especially pain, and it is very frustrating to see how animals’ behavior that correspond with pain states are being ignored, or not even viewed from a compassionate lens. As humans, with our language abilities, we have the responsibility to use our voice (and actions!) to replace animals’ lack of language to advocate against their constant exploitation and unnecessary suffering.
ReplyDeleteCan, we have the mirror capacities to perceive their pain, but we also have the "out of sight, out of mind" option of looking away.
Delete
ReplyDeleteHi Kaitlin,
I fully agree with your observations in the first paragraph. Let’s be honest: the vast majority of us are aware that animals possess sentience. Yet, we often choose to live in a state of willful ignorance or cognitive dissonance, as you've pointed out.
This topic brings to mind those directly facing this moral dilemma: factory farm workers, slaughterers, etc. How do they reconcile their actions with their (suspected) knowledge of animal sentience? While satisfying one’s own needs, likely financially, might be a primary driver, as you alluded to, I'm convinced there's more complexity to their reasoning. The psychological impacts on these workers, how their experiences shape their views on animal sentience and personal mental health, definitely call for further exploration.
Additionally, consider individuals who might be viewed as more ethical meat consumers, such as hunters. This group is diverse, including those who hunt out of necessity and those who choose hunting over purchasing meat. The motivations and ethical frameworks of the latter, who opt for hunting as a conscious choice, are particularly intriguing. Maybe it connects to tradition, sustainability, or simply a different understanding of human’s relationship to other sentient beings.
Gabe, for the victims, the slaughterer's motivation is no consolation.
DeleteThere was a discussion above about neonatal anesthesia, so I wanted to add my own bit to it. From what I understand, up until very recently, squid were seen to not feel pain. Thus, lots of research was done using squids in an effort to bypass the existing ethical regulations. However, it was found that squid were also able to display some of the behaviors that us mind-reading humans have inferred as behaviors to avoid pain. Obviously, from the 10A and now the 10B reading, it is hard to really say rather squid actually do feel pain considering the OMP, but, the mere fact that for so long, humans have taken for granted that other species including their own (babies) do not feel pain due to their inability to communicate so in a way that we can understand is shocking. We may never know what it’s like to be another species, but that alone does not give us the right to mind-read other species and determine whether they are capable of feeling pain or not.
ReplyDeleteWhen it comes to why such a survival/production machine would have evolved minds, I think that minds and feelings would somehow contribute to a more stable and efficient reproduction and survival of human societies (because empathy is more likely to lower the rate of child-eating and more likely to help each other). If we assume that a lack of a certain ability is an evolutionary lack of that ability, then this idea would lead me to think of "other minds" in a different way, i.e., that the reason humans haven't evolved mind-reading is because it is not beneficial in terms of reproduction and survival.
ReplyDeleteYou bring up a very interesting point. I think what you're saying is that the reason we can't read the minds of animals other than humans is because not being able to do so benefits us. I will argue with an example from my life. After the reading I called my dad (who loves processed meat products). I asked him whether he had considered that the meat he is consuming once was alive and could have had felt pain, felt alone, suffered, etc. His response was that this has always been how it is. Humans are omnivorous. The weak will be hunted. He's a nice guy I promise he's just a little defensive. Anyway, so what I'm saying is (sorry for the sidetrack) I think we still have some sort of intuition about the feelings of animals because we are empathetic beings. I might have misunderstood your comment, though and if that's the case think of this as a not so fun little anecdote.
DeleteWhat's very interesting about human mind-reading of other species is that most works of fiction that give humans or human-like characters the ability to read the minds of animals automatically assume that they think logically in the same way that humans do. While this can be construed as anthropomorphism in a work of literature, it still mirrors the situation mentioned in the article as the previous article “Key on Fish Pain” does. One thing that can be affirmed about human mind-reading abilities is that animals have feelings, but what we miss out on is that their feelings may not be at all the same as ours, for the very reason that we always assume that animals feel the same as humans.
ReplyDeleteJinyu, it's safe to assume that if it hurts, it feels bad, not good.
DeleteThe section Consequences of Error and the Whose other-minds problem were an excellent argument for being more aware of the feelings of other species. The former section made me think about the effects of errors on our own species and how bad they would make me feel if I personally committed them (though this is most certainly not the case for some other people and organizations). The latter section frankly made me feel cognitive dissonance for consuming and using animal product. For someone who advocates and believes in human liberty, why might the same not be extended to animals? And if already extended, why to some animals over others?
ReplyDeleteProfessor Harnad mentions the ‘Consequences of error’, which ties back to the fish-pain article written by Key in 11a. Professor Harnad states that, “there is something far more important at stake than just the truth, namely, the consequences of being wrong”. He explains that we are not capable of feeling the ‘hurt’ of another organism. He clarifies that it is only the other organism (which we (or Descartes) considered as being mindless) that can feel the hurting sensation. This ties back to what I thought when I was reading Key’s article in 11a. Although fishes lack the neural architecture that we humans have, it seems ethically wrong to conclude that fishes don’t feel pain and use that as an excuse to maltreat them in whatever form we’d like. We as humans, are limited to our subjective experiences, and therefore we are prone to these consequences of error. Therefore, it is the other species that are at risk from our scepticism.
ReplyDeleteThis was a tough pill for me to swallow. As a Turkish person, most of our diet is a mix of mediterranean dishes and meat. I feel guilty for never considering the fact that what’s on my plate was once alive and could very possibly have had feelings. This reading has definitely made me rethink my meat consumption. I will be sharing it with family and friends as well. The consequence of error is truly gut wrenching. I think a way to use the other minds problem to our and others’ advantage on a daily basis, it’s nice to think of Confucius’s saying: Do not do to others what you do not want done to yourself. Words to live by.
ReplyDeleteNazli, yes, the Golden Rule is at the heart of all morality: it is a mirror-rule.
DeleteThere is a hierarchy of animals based on their proximity to society and how we judge their ability to feel. For instance, fishing exploitation is not an issue known by many and it is just so convenient if we say they are non-feeling. Beef is one of the most consumed meats worldwide, but cows are sacred in Hinduism, such that there are laws regulating the slaughter or sale of cows in India.
ReplyDeleteI have an understanding after reviewing what we considered as empirical. There is never a solid “truth”; we could only refer a strong probability that something is highly likely correct from a strong casual relationship between things. Therefore, based on this observation, there is no point to discuss whether a fish or bird could feel pain when they are structurally different from mammals. Mirror neurons determines the capacity of “mind-reading”, which is not just discovered in humans, but in other species as well. This is a strong causality and will indicate a strong probability that they do feel, because we feel. We, humans, could express or specifically describe what we feel through languages, which is considered as an unique learning capacity through evolution; but other species could still feel but without the ability to tell, particularly to humans. Thus, animals do feel.
ReplyDeleteMany have been talking about how the OMP has been illuminated to them in the sense of being more applicable to other species rather than other humans because of our great empathy/mirror/mind-reading capabilities that are designed for other humans. I am drawn to the pragmatic path of engineering those capabilities for the sake of benefitting other species rather than subjugating, torturing, and slaughtering them. Similarly, to the Mirror Neuron Initiative that we talked about in class, that genre of action seems like the most effective. Just as the meat industry utilizes our mirror neuron capabilities in the negative sense (barring any footage from getting out of the cruelty that goes on every day) we should work for the opposite of that to change people’s perspectives and feel for the animals. It is very known how human attention about these things can be manipulated for evil ends, but we can do the same for good.
ReplyDeleteIn the "other species" section of this text, it is mentioned that it would be irrational to doubt that we are feeling when we are indeed feeling. I believe this assertion may stem from the idea that we need to feel in order to doubt that we are feeling. However, in the case of Chalmers' zombie, the zombie would not recognize that it feels, even though, in truth, it wouldn’t feel. Similarly, it could be possible to have a T3 robot that expresses that it feels but doesn't actually experience those feelings. In this case, would the T3 robot genuinely feel that it feels?
ReplyDeleteLiam, don't tie yourself into philosophical knots for naught. Of course: an entity can be able to feel or unable to feel. If it cannot feel it can still behave (do and say) exactly as if it feels.
DeleteIt is not that "we need to feel in order to doubt that we are feeling." It is that if we are feeling, we cannot doubt it.
Doubt is not just a proposition: "It is not true that I am feeling." It is a felt state; otherwise it is just a string of symbols. I cannot feel "this feels like a toothache" while feeling "this does not feel like a toothache." Chalmers's zombie, defined as an entity that cannot feel" could not "recognize" that it does not feel, because it feels like something to recognize something (just as it feels like something to mean, understand, believe or doubt something). An insentient T3 robot (i.e., a "zombie") could say it feels, but it could not (by definition) feel (anything).
Saying is DOing, not FEELing.
Thomas, and the question to ask oneself now is: "Am I seeing this horror now, yet not doing anything about it?" Not "what would future generations think of me?" but "What do I think of me?"
ReplyDelete